Transhumanism is the school of thought that advocates the use of technology to enhance the human species, to the point where some supporters consider that a new species altogether could arise. Even some critics think this at least a technological possibility. Some supporters also believe the emergence of a new, improved, superhuman species raises no special ethical questions. Through an examination of the metaphysics of species, and an analysis of the essence of the human species, I argue that the existence of an embodied, genuinely superhuman species is a metaphysical impossibility. Finally, I point out an interesting ethical consideration that this metaphysical truth raises.
Introduction
Transhumanism is a hydra-headed movement embracing a multitude of streams of thought. At the more moderate end, transhumanists advocate 12 Part of the reason for this bewildering array of proposals is the tendency of many biologists to ignore the crucial philosophical element of the 'species problem', treating the latter as no more than a task for empirical science to sort out and any philosophizing about it to be obscurely metaphysical. Combine this with a natural tendency to pragmatism and instrumentalism (in the loose sense) among working scientists, and we have some explanation for the willingness of not a few theorists about species to let a hundred flowers bloom: what a species is depends on your theoretical interests, how you carve up the world of individual organisms, and so on. Assumption 2: There are criteria for providing those definite answers.
Assumption 3: Whilst we might not have metaphysically necessary and sufficient conditions for species identity, there are at least some cases in which we have metaphysically sufficient conditions.
As to the first assumption, all we need to admit is that some kinds of organism clearly belong to the same species no matter how you plausibly slice the biological cake, and others to different species. Tom and Jerry belong to different species; Clever Hans and Sea Biscuit belong to the same species, without a shadow of a doubt. As to the third assumption: in any possible world -restrict accessibility if you wish to nomologically identical worlds -in which an organism is a water- fragments. For the biologist, then, it is not just rationality but quite specific bodily shape and structure that make for a genuine human being.
Moreover, were we non-specialists to see Homo habilis crossing the road, we would hardly acknowledge him to be 'one of us'. wouldn't this reason on its own merely beg the question of why temporal priority in the phylogenetic tree should make a difference? More precisely, the circularity involved in appealing solely to temporal priority would be that of taking the relevant priority to be one in which speciation is assumed. In other words, there is an innocent reading of 'temporally prior', namely that Homo habilis existed before (or long before) Homo sapiens, to which the response is -so what? And there is a non-innocent reading, according to which Homo habilis is not human -not one of us humans -because it is an earlier species in the phylogenetic tree. Clearly this will not do.
That it does not do is shown by the fact that taxonomists do not appeal to mere temporal priority: such an appeal is more the stuff of casual banter that is the staple of popular discourse about evolution. For palaeoanthropologists tell us also that Homo habilis was, bodily, very unlike modern humans, with less than half the brain size, disproportionately long arms, and a distinctively ape-like appearance. merely a member of the genus Homo as taxonomists now have it, but as one of us, metaphysically speaking. But let me put our putative ancestors to one side and take on far more radical scenarios, for if the case can be made for these it can be made for any actual biological ancestor of ours that was also rational.
Exotic rational animals
John Locke famously thought that a rational parrot would be a person but not a human being. Rational parrots would, he considered, 'have passed for a race of rational animals' but they would nevertheless have been parrots, not men: 'For I presume it is not the idea of a thinking or rational being alone that makes the idea of a man in most people's sense: but of a body, so and so shaped, joined to it: and if that be the idea of a man, the same successive body not shifted all at once, must, as well as the same immaterial spirit, go to the making of the same man.' 29 Leibniz does not demur: 'there is no obstacle to there being rational animals of some other species than ours. … Indeed it does seem that the definition of "man" as "rational animal" needs to be amplified by something about the shape and attempts to understand and resolve, matters concerning its own life, the lives of others (be they rational or not), the state of the world, the connections between things and events; a moral life, with all that is entailed by a grasp of morality as a system of norms for living. We can easily add to the list, of course: humour, irony, aesthetic sensibility, the creation and maintenance of families and political societies…we all know the sorts of things we rational animals are capable of. Now I do not wish, or need, to begin the difficult task of drawing all the logical and conceptual connections between these multifarious aspects of life as a rational animal. All I claim here is that rationality as the capacity for abstract conceptual thought is explanatorily basic relative to a large number of the sorts of characteristic listed here. Language is the most important case in point. Abstraction from particulars and ascent to the level of conceptual thought necessarily involves some kind of representational system because it essentially involves the composition and division of concepts: mental elements are put together or divided in order to make judgments, and judgments are put together to make inferences. The elements have to have some kind of meaningful structure, by which I mean a structure involving at least the basic operations of 2008)) to take paradigmatic rationality to involve certain basic inferential abilities.
The tie to language, for him, involves computation over contentful syntactic structures in Mentalese, a language not to be counted among the natural languages with which we are familiar (though it is of course natural). Although I do not regard the necessity of language to rationality as having anything essential to do with either computation or a 'language of thought', I cannot pursue the matter here.
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25 singleton rational animal necessarily alone in some environment (not something transhumanists are interested in anyway), if we have: several rational animals, each knowing the other is rational (since rationality entails being able to recognize similarities, including the presence of rationality outside oneself at least in some circumstances), all employing the same generic vegetative functions, with the same generic sensory abilities, in the same environment, then at the very least it is highly likely they will communicate with each other. Why must they be able to? Take a simple line of thought: a rational animal will want to know the answer to something; so it will pose a question; and if it recognizes another rational animal that might know the answer, it will pose it to the other. If the animal has language, can ask a question, wants an answer, and thinks it can get one from another animal, does it not have everything it needs to be able to communicate? And if it can, why would it not? Don't we rational animals show exactly how this works?
So we can be fairly certain that all rational animals are able to communicate. What we haven't shown yet is that they can all communicate with each other. What we do know is that they can all attempt to communicate with each other, for the same reason that they can successfully communicate with some others. That some rational animals might not be interested in communicating with others is Homo sapiens is possible precisely because of our identical body planthe animal part of our natures -this will not be the case with a radically different rational animal. Moreover, we can ignore sceptical worries about how our fellow Homo sapiens experience the world since we make sound inferences to the best explanation of how they function in terms of how their bodies causally interact with their surroundings.
So consider a mythical rational animal, Glog. He/she -better ithas three heads full of liquid hydrogen, seventeen sensory organs, and twelve tentacles of varying lengths placed strategically around a spherical gratitude. If Glog is rational, and it wants to thank us, it won't try to kill us. If it is rational, grateful and evil it might, but that's a different matter.
All of this is fun speculation, the stuff of which careers in science fiction are made. The philosophical point is that, being rational, Glog has the characteristics I listed earlier. Glog will have a life plan; it will be able to order priorities and objectives; it will worry and wonder about things, try to solve its deepest problems, consider its mortality, We go wrong more significantly in conceiving of biology in an unduly restrictive way. When biologists, as they usually do in describing
Homo sapiens, refer to the manifestations of rationality, not just animality, are they doing biology? In the narrow sense, no: they should stick to genetics and descent. In the broad sense, of course they are: to do biology in this sense you have to do psychology as well. Indeed, it is the Aristotelian's lament that psychology, which used to mean 'the science of science of the mind, with biology narrowly conceived being split off into a different discipline -as though you could study rationality without ipso facto studying animality, and vice versa.
To think correctly about the issue before us, we should either force ourselves to think of the term 'human' in more broadly biological terms, or else abandon it pro tem and just use the term 'rational animal'. This will enable us to put methodological bias to one side and consider simply the metaphysics of the matter. Metaphysically, Glog is one of us in all that counts.
Finally, before putting Glog to rest, we should note the following.
There is, of course, a very important sense in which Glog is not one of us, any more than a Great Dane is one of the Chihuahuas. Glog is not a distinct species from us under the genus rational animal. Rather, it is a distinct variety from us under the infima species rational animal. That we and Glog could not interbreed is, as we know, not a defeater for being of the same species even in the narrow biological sense (let alone the 
Superhumans
Exotic rational animals of the type exemplified by Glog are decidedly not what transhumanists have in mind when they speak, as they sometimes do, of a new posthuman species. What they are thinking of is an animal that is bigger, better, brainier than us poor Homo sapiens, enhanced by 44 For these examples and more, and a discussion of ring species in general, see M.A. 
Conclusion -an ethical implication
If what I have argued is correct, it is no more than an exemplification of the thesis that there is and can be nothing in between humans and angels.
If there is an ontological hierarchy, as I believe, then from God we descend to spirits and then human beings. There is no space between the rational animals and the disembodied spirits, metaphysically speaking.
Superhumans, therefore, will always be one of us no matter how different they seem. At which many will wonder -who cares? What difference does it make whether we correctly call a posthuman or superhuman a member of our species or a member of a distinct species?
One might, in other words, wonder whether the issue is more than a verbal one. Suppose the transhumanist concedes the metaphysical point: a superhuman would not belong to a new species distinct from human 49 Angels are traditionally held to know things by a kind of intellectual apprehension, a direct knowledge unmediated by sensory impulses. For Aquinas on angelic knowledge, see ST I, beings; both it and we would all belong to the rational animal kind.
Nevertheless, the superhuman would be a superior 'variety', so to speak, of rational animal. As the Mastiff is to the Poodle in strength; as the German Shepherd is to the Afghan Hound in intelligence, and so on; so the superhuman would be to the ordinary human, multiplied by much larger factors. The facts that matter -that are of any practical interestwould be the same, whatever the species allocation.
I propose, however, at least one rather interesting and surprising ethical implication that does make this more than an abstruse and to the audience for their comments. I would also like to thank two anonymous referees for a number of suggestions that have further improved the paper.
